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This	  article	  makes	  a	  claim	  for	   re-­‐engaging	   the	  concept	  of	   ‘act’	   in	   the	  study	  of	  securitisation.	  While	  
much	  has	  been	  written	  about	  the	  discursive	  and	  communicative	  aspects	  of	  securitising,	  the	  concept	  
of	   ‘act’	   that	   contains	   much	   of	   the	   politicality	   of	   the	   speech	   act	   approach	   to	   security	   has	   been	  
relatively	   ignored.	   The	   task	   of	   re-­‐engaging	   ‘acts’	   is	   particularly	   pertinent	   in	   the	   contemporary	  
context	   in	   which	   politically	   salient	   speech	   acts	   are	   heavily	   displaced	   by	   securitising	   practices	   and	  
devices	   that	   appear	   as	   banal,	   little	   security	   nothings.	   The	   main	   purpose	   of	   the	   article	   is	   to	   start	  
framing	   a	   research	   agenda	   that	   asks	   what	   political	   acts	   can	   be	   in	   diffuse	   security	   processes	   that	  
efface	  securitising	  speech	  acts.	  
.	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‘I	  discuss	  security	  as	  a	  speech	  act’,	  Ole	  Wæver	  writes	  in	  1995	  (Wæver,	  1995).	  This	  idea	  has	  played	  a	  
significant	   role	   in	   rallying	   research	   that	   studies	   insecurity	  not	  as	  an	  environmental	   condition	  upon	  
which	   one	   acts	   but	   as	   the	   discursive	   rendition	   of	   that	   environment	   through	   security	   practice.	  	  
Wæver	   and	   his	   colleagues	   at	   the	   Copenhagen	   Peace	   Research	   Institute	   were	   not	   the	   only	   ones	  
working	  the	  linguistic	  turn	  in	  philosophy	  and	  social	  theory	  into	  security	  studies	  (e.g.	  Campbell,	  1992,	  
Der	   Derian	   and	   Shapiro,	   1989,	   Fierke,	   1998)	   but	   theirs	   was	   among	   the	   most	   successful	   in	  
International	  Studies.	  Since	  the	  mid-­‐1990s,	  it	  has	  been	  taken	  up	  by	  an	  increasing	  number	  of	  people	  
studying	  a	  wide	   range	  of	   securitising	  processes	  and	  has	  persistently	  generated	   intense	   conceptual	  
and	  theoretical	  debates	  about	  the	  nature	  of	  securitising.	  
Compared	   to	   other	   linguistic	   conceptions	   of	   security	   (such	   as	   language	   games,	   writing	   security,	  
security	   discourse),	   which	   are	   more	   intuitively	   adept	   to	   studying	   intersubjective	   processes	   of	  
meaning	   construction,	   the	   notion	   of	   ‘security	   speech	   act’	   expresses	   a	  more	   recognisable	   political	  
investment.	   The	   notion	   of	   ‘act’	   carries	   both	   a	   conception	   of	   the	   political	   and	   a	   possibility	   for	   a	  
political	   critique	   of	   security	   practice	   that	   resonates	   with	   conventional	   understandings	   of	   politics	  
emphasising	  the	  role	  of	  political	  elite	  and	  key	  political	  institutions	  like	  parliaments	  and	  diplomacy.	  	  
This	  article	  argues	   for	   re-­‐engaging	   the	  concept	  of	   ‘act’	   in	   the	  security	   speech	  act.	  The	   first	   section	  
argues	  this	  on	  the	  grounds	  that	  the	  notion	  of	  ‘act’	  rather	  than	  speech	  carries	  the	  political	  investment	  
–	   including	   the	  possibility	   for	  political	   critique–	  of	   the	   securitisation	  approach.	  The	   second	   section	  
adds	  a	  complication	  to	  the	  call	  for	  this	  re-­‐engagement.	  A	  number	  of	  significant	  securitising	  processes	  
exist,	  among	  others	  instances	  of	  the	  technologically	  mediated	  spread	  of	  surveillance	  and	  the	  folding	  
of	   securitising	   into	   everyday	   life,	   which	   are	   effacing	   speech	   acts	   with	   weighty	   decision-­‐making	  
significance.	  Speech	  acts	  of	  security	  seem	  to	  be	  displaced	  by	  the	  diffuse	  and	  associative	  securitising	  
work	   of	   what	   from	   the	   perspective	   of	   existential	   speech	   acts	   mostly	   appear	   as	   little	   security	  
nothings,	  such	  as	  programming	  algorithms,	  routine	  collections	  of	  data,	  and	  looking	  at	  CCTV	  cameras.	  
The	  third	  section	  demonstrates	  that	  it	  remains	  nevertheless	  important	  to	  engage	  the	  concept	  of	  ‘act’	  
for	   a	   political	   study	   of	   securitising.	   Such	   re-­‐engaging	   will	   require	   letting	   go	   of	   the	   exceptionalist	  
rendition	  of	  acts	   in	   the	  securitisation	  approach,	  however,	  and	  developing	  conceptions	  of	  acts	   that	  
can	  account	  for	  rupture	  in	  the	  diffuse	  politics	  of	  little	  security	  nothings.	  
The	  ‘act’	  in	  security	  speech	  acts	  
Because	  the	  move	  towards	  understanding	  security	  as	  a	  practice	  of	  making	  insecurities	  was	  strongly	  
embedded	  in	  the	  linguistic	  turn,	  much	  attention	  went	  to	  examining	  discourse	  and	  speech:	  including	  
the	   ontological	   status	   of	   language,	   discourse	   as	  methodology,	   speech	   acts	   as	   a	   particular	   form	  of	  
speech,	   and	   rhetorical	   structures	   and	   grammars	   of	   security	   speech.	   Discussions	   opened	   up,	  
sometimes	  briefly	  sometimes	  sustained	  and	  intense,	  over	  issues	  such	  as	  the	  meaning	  of	  security	  that	  
was	   ‘activated’	   in	   the	   speech	   act,	   the	   exclusion	   of	   silence,	   the	   relevance	   of	   images,	   and	   the	  
conditions	  of	   felicity	  of	  a	   speech	  act.	  The	  conception	  of	   ‘act’	   itself,	  however,	  has	   remained	   largely	  
untouched.	   It	  mainly	   functioned	   as	   a	   signifier	   included	   for	   expressing	   the	   performative	   nature	   of	  
language,	  i.e.	  marking	  that	  language	  does	  not	  mirror	  the	  world	  but	  acts	  upon	  it	  and	  creates	  stuff.	  	  
Recently	   the	   question	   of	   the	   effects	   of	   speech	   acts	   of	   security	   on	   its	   audience	   led	   to	   a	   focus	   on	  
theorising	   communicative	   relations.	   Moving	   the	   discussion	   from	   what	   is	   invested	   in	   the	   security	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speech	  to	  how	  this	  investment	  is	  (or,	  is	  not)	  carried	  from	  speakers	  to	  audiences	  brings	  practice	  more	  
explicitly	  into	  the	  picture.	  It	  is	  not	  just	  the	  speech	  that	  matters	  but	  the	  circulation	  of	  security	  speech	  
and	   its	  appropriation	  or	   refusal	  by	   those	  who	  are	  addressed.	  This	   interrogation	  of	   the	   speech	  act,	  
however,	  does	  not	  unpack	  explicitly	  what	  is	  invested	  in	  the	  notion	  of	  ‘act’	  either.	  It	  folds	  the	  act	  into	  
conceptions	   of	   interaction	   –	   pragmatist	   (Balzacq,	   2005)	   or	   dramaturgical	   (Salter,	   2008)	   –	   and	   an	  
interest	  in	  the	  effectiveness	  of	  speech	  act,	  i.e.	  in	  its	  outward	  orientation.	  
Yet,	  the	  notion	  of	  ‘act’	  is	  central	  for	  understanding	  the	  political	  investment	  made	  in	  moving	  towards	  
studying	   security	   as	   a	   speech	   act.	   The	   concept	   of	   ‘act’	   conditions	   the	   political	   critique	   of	   security	  
practice	  that	  is	  possible	  within	  this	  approach.	  
Let’s	  start	  from	  two	  short	  quotes	  that	  express	  the	  political	  dimensions	  of	  the	  security	  speech	  act:	  
‘By	  uttering	  “security”	  a	  state-­‐representative	  moves	  a	  particular	  development	  into	  a	  specific	  
area,	   and	   thereby	   claims	  a	   special	   right	   to	  use	  whatever	  means	  are	  necessary	   to	  block	   it.‘	  
(Wæver,	  1995:	  55)	  
	  ‘Thereby	  the	  actor	  has	  claimed	  a	  right	  to	  handle	  the	  issue	  through	  extraordinary	  means	  to	  
break	  the	  normal	  political	  rules	  of	  the	  game	  ...’	  (Buzan	  et	  al.,	  1998:	  24)	  
The	  key	  political	  quality	  of	   the	  speech	  act	  of	  security	   is	  a	  break	   in	  the	  normal	  political	   rules	  of	   the	  
game.	  When	  security	  becomes	  an	  act	  it	  is	  not	  a	  routine	  practice,	  an	  acting	  out	  of	  given	  procedures	  
and	  institutionalised	  conditions	  of	  felicity,	  a	  habitual	  practice,	  but	  it	  creates	  a	  scene	  in	  which	  actors	  
and	  things	  are	  brought	  into	  a	  relation	  that	  challenges	  a	  given	  way	  of	  doing	  things.	  It	  sets	  something	  
in	  motion	  by	  enacting	  the	  unexpected,	  unknown,	  unpredictable	  (Isin,	  2008:	  27).	  A	  break	  in	  instituted	  
normality	   is	   what	  makes	   securitisation	   –	   a	   state-­‐representative	  moving	   a	   particular	   development	  
into	  a	  [security]	  area	  –	  political.	  
Following	  Isin’s	  work	  on	  ‘acts’,	   let’s	  use	  the	  term	  ‘rupture’	  to	  express	  this	  central	  quality	  of	  an	  act.	  
(Isin,	  2008)	  An	  act	  creates	  ‘a	  scene’	  that	  ruptures	  a	  given	  order.	  The	  idea	  of	  rupture	  does	  not	  refer	  to	  
replacing	  one	  order	  with	  another	  or	  one	  conception	  of	  order	  challenging	  another,	  however.	  Rather	  it	  
refers	  to	  practices	  that	  create	  boundary	  conditions,	  however	  infinitesimal	  and	  momentary,	  through	  
enacting	  limits	  of	  a	  given	  order.	  Enacting	  refers	  to	  both	  expressing	  limits	  and	  bringing	  the	  limits	  into	  
being	  as	  an	  issue	  of	  contestation.2	  They	  ‘raise	  the	  bet’	  and	  create	  ‘a	  test	  case’.	  
‘The	  point	  of	  my	  argument,	  however,	  is	  not	  that	  to	  speak	  “security”	  means	  simply	  to	  talk	  in	  a	  
higher-­‐pitched	  voice.	  It	  is	  slightly	  more	  complex	  than	  that:	  “security”	  is	  a	  specific	  move	  that	  
entails	  consequences	  which	  involve	  risking	  oneself	  and	  offering	  a	  specific	  issue	  as	  a	  test	  case.	  
Doing	  this	  may	  have	  a	  price	  and,	   in	  that	  sense,	   it	  could	  be	  regarded	  as	  a	  way	  to	  “raise	  the	  
bet”.’	  (Wæver,	  1995:	  75)	  
At	  issue	  is	  not	  if	  an	  audience	  accepts	  the	  speech	  act	  of	  security	  –	  if	  the	  intentionality	  of	  securitising	  
by	  those	  speaking	  security	   is	  realised	  through	  an	  audience	  agreeing	  with	  them	  or	  not.	  Neither	   is	   it	  
whether	   security	  practices	  and	   technologies	  become	   institutionalised	   in	   routines	  and	   technologies	  
one	   encounters	   at	   airports	   or	   embassies.	   The	   ‘realisation’	   of	   an	   act	   consists	   of	   the	   creation	   of	   a	  
rupturing	  scene	  itself,	  irrespective	  of	  its	  acceptance	  and	  institutionalisation.	  ‘To	  act,	  then,	  is	  neither	  
arriving	  at	   a	   scene	  nor	   fleeing	   from	   it,	   but	   actually	   engaging	   in	   its	   creation.’	   (Isin,	   2008:	  27)	  What	  
matters	   is	   that	   the	  scene	  brought	   into	  existence	  as	   ‘an	  assemblage	  of	  acts,	  actions	  and	  actors	   in	  a	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2	  For	  examples:	  Isin	  and	  Nielsen	  (2008);	  Andrijasevic	  et	  al.	  (2010),	  Aradau	  et	  al.	  	  (2010)	  
4	  
historically	   and	   geographically	   concrete	   situation’	   (Isin,	   2008:	   24)	   by	   actors	   remaining	   at	   the	  
rupturing	  scene	  rather	  than	  fleeing	  from	  it.	  	  
Speech	   acts	   rupture	   a	   given	   situation	   in	   a	   decision	   to	   create.	   The	   concept	   of	   decision	   is	   another	  
central	   element	   of	   the	   politicality	   of	   acts,	   as	   used	   in	   the	   securitisation	   literature.	  When	   ‘a	   state-­‐
representative	  moves	   a	   particular	   development	   into	   a	   [security]	   area’	   when	   ‘they	   offer	   a	   specific	  
issue	  as	  a	  test	  case’	  they	  make	  a	  decision.	  ‘Decision’	  here	  does	  not	  simply	  refer	  to	  an	  expression	  of	  
volition	  –	  the	  will	  to	  create,	  to	  decide	  –	  or	  of	  choice	  between	  given	  options.	  As	  a	  political	  category	  it	  
implies,	   what	   Isin	   following	   Bakhtin	   calls,	   answerability	   (Isin,	   2008:	   28-­‐35).	   Answerability	   has	  
different	  dimensions.	  An	  act	  actualised	   in	  a	  decision	   introduces	   responsibility	   towards	  others.	  One	  
cannot	  hide	  behind	  necessity,	   routine,	  habits	   in	   the	  act	  of	   security	   creation.	   Speaking	   security	   is	  a	  
decision	  to	  rupture	  a	  situation	  with	  certain	  calculable	  consequences	  for	  others.	  ‘Power	  holders’	  can	  
then	   be	   made	   responsible	   and	   procedures	   of	   accountability	   can	   be	   applied.	   Combined	   with	  
instituted	  demands	  for	  and	  mechanisms	  of	  transparency	  and	  accountability	  of	  decisions,	  rendering	  
responsible	   is	  a	  central	  element	  of	  political	  criticism	  of	  security	  practice,	  especially	  since	  the	   latter	  
often	  seeks	  special	  status	  by	  claiming	  to	  be	  under	  the	  spell	  of	  necessity	  –	  no	  choices	  when	  survival	  is	  
at	  stake	  –	  and	  by	  instituting	  an	  imperative	  of	  secrecy	  –	  revealing	  intelligence	  will	  help	  enemies	  and	  
criminals	  in	  countering	  intelligence	  gathering	  (e.g.	  Wood	  and	  Dupont,	  2006).	  This	  is	  the	  first	  way	  in	  
which	  the	  concept	  of	  act	  introduces	  a	  condition	  of	  political	  critique	  of	  securitisation.	  
Answerability	   to	  others	  also	   refers	   to	   the	  authorisation	  of	   authority.	  What	  authorises	  decisions	   to	  
rupture	   the	   given?	   The	   security	   speech	   act	   legitimates	   authority	   to	   move	   from	   the	   normal	  
procedures	  of	  democratic	  politics	  to	  exceptional	  political	  measures	  by	  referring	  to	  existential	  threats	  
that	   cannot	   be	   met	   within	   the	   confines	   of	   the	   ‘usual’	   procedures	   and	   repertoire	   of	   actions.	  
Answerability	  to	  others	  here	  brings	  the	  process	  of	  securitising	  to	  political	  judgement	  in	  public	  debate	  
around	   the	   legitimacy	   of	   transgressive	   authority	   moving	   matters	   into	   a	   terrain	   of	   exceptional	  
politics.	   Political	   critique	   often	   mobilises	   the	   priority	   of	   constitutional	   and	   fundamental	   rights,	  
institutional	   checks	   and	   balances,	   the	   relation	   between	   security	   and	   freedom	   to	   enact	   this	  
answerability	  of	  speech	  acts	  of	  security.	  
Both	  forms	  of	  answerability	  fold	  the	  rupture	  somehow	  back	  into	  an	  existing	  order	  –	  into	  instituted	  
practices	   of	   political	   legitimisation	   and	   political	   responsibilisation.	  While	   transgressing	   an	   existing	  
situation,	  the	  politics	  of	  rupture	  are	  connected	  back	  to	  normative	  and	  political	  orders	  that	  provide	  
the	   basis	   for	   evaluating	   and	   contesting	   the	   acceptability	   of	   transgressions	   in	   terms	   of	   calculable	  
consequences	  of	  the	  act	  –	  translated	  back	  into	  responsibility	  of	  the	  actors	  for	  their	  decisions	  –	  and	  
norms	  of	  authorisation.	  	  
Yet,	   the	   security	   speech	   act	   in	  Wæver’s	   and	  Buzan’s	   formulation	   cannot	   be	   fully	   folded	   back	   into	  
given	   orders.	   As	   ‘a	   move	   that	   entails	   consequences	   which	   involve	   risking	   oneself	   and	   offering	   a	  
specific	   issue	  as	  a	  test	  case’,	   it	  retains	  traces	  of	  a	  more	  excessive	  conception	  of	  act.	  As	  Isin	  argues,	  
the	   concept	   of	   act	   refers	   to	   rupturing	   actions	   that	   somehow	   are	   always	   also	   a	   move	   into	   the	  
unexpected	  and	  unknown3.	  Arguably,	  this	  dimension	  of	  the	  conception	  of	  act	  takes	  it	  outside	  of	  the	  
Austinian	  framing	  of	  speech	  act,	  which	  is	  heavily	  embedded	  in	  instituted	  structures	  of	  meaning.	  It	  is	  
important,	  however,	  to	  include	  this	  dimension	  to	  understand	  the	  paradoxical	  notion	  of	  politics	  that	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3	  In	  current	  international	  studies	  this	  aspect	  is	  brought	  out	  most	  sharply	  in	  Derridean	  readings	  of	  the	  political:	  
Edkins	  1999.	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is	   invested	   in	   the	   concept	   of	   act.	   The	   politicality	   of	   the	   act	   cannot	   be	   exhausted	   by	   process	   of	  
legitimisation	  and	  accountability.	  It	  implies	  a	  third	  answerability;	  answerability	  as	  the	  affirmation	  of	  
undecidability,	   the	   radical	   openness	   and	   the	   creativity	  of	  being,	   the	  possibility	  of	   the	  unexpected;	  	  
actions	   that	   cannot	   be	   fully	   folded	   back	   into	   calculability	   and	   instituted	   normativity.	   This	  
answerability	   implies	   the	   possibility	   for	   a	   political	   critique	   that	   demands	   that	   the	   rupture	   –	   i.e.	  
security	  emergencies	  –	  enacted	  through	  the	  speech	  acts	  of	  security	  are	  not	   immediately	  politically	  
closed	  by	  mobilising	   security	   institutions	  and	   routines	   that	  are	  embedded	   in	   the	  existing	  order.	   In	  
this	   conception,	   the	   security	   speech	   act	   creates	   a	   gravitational	  moment	   in	  which	  political	   critique	  
does	  not	  simply	  depend	  on	  bringing	  into	  play	  instituted	  practices	  of	  accountability	  and	  legitimacy	  to	  
hold	  the	  claim	  to	  transgressive	  power	  to	  account	  but	  also	  thrives	  in	  the	  rupture	  of	  the	  given	  order	  
that	  the	  security	  speech	  act	  constitutes.	  This	  paradoxical	  condition	  of	  politicality	  (Isin,	  2008:	  29)	  that	  
is	   invested	   in	   the	   security	   speech	  act	   has	  often	   remained	  unexplored.	   The	  political	   critique	  of	   the	  
speaking	  of	  security	  usually	  folds	  the	  act	  back	  into	  a	  given	  order.	  Without	  reference	  to	  an	  order	  one	  
cannot	   say	   much	   about	   the	   speech	   act	   and	   the	   immediate	   political	   answerability	   implied	   by	   the	  
decision	   requires	   referencing	   back	   to	   an	   order.	   Yet,	   as	   act	   it	   also	   retains	   a	   radical	   distance	   from	  
normative	   and	   causal	   orders;	   its	   politicality	   resides	   in	   its	   rupturing	   quality.	   While	   the	   former	  
answerability	   is	   often	   deployed	   to	   demonstrate	   the	   un-­‐democratic,	   and	   in	   Wæver	   and	   Buzan’s	  
terminology	  depoliticizing,	  qualities,	  the	   latter	  answerability	  points	   in	  the	  opposite	  direction	  of	  the	  
speech	  act	  of	  security	  being	  radically	  politicising.4	  	  
Wæver	  and	  Buzan	  politically	  substantiate	  this	  paradoxical	  quality	  of	  the	  act	  by	  folding	  it	  into	  political	  
exceptionalism.	   As	   argued	   elsewhere	   (Huysmans,	   2006,	   Huysmans,	   1998),	   when	   they	   say	   that	   by	  
declaring	  security	  the	  power	  holders	  claim	  special	  rights	  they	  do	  not	  simply	  mean	  that	  they	  rupture	  
but	  also	  that	  rupturing	  through	  calling	  upon	  existential	  situations	  brings	  exceptionalist	  politics	   into	  
play.	  Exceptionalism	  authorises	  transgressive	  authority	  and	  enacts	   limits	  of	  a	  given	  order	  by	  calling	  
upon	   existential	   threats.	   In	   doing	   so	   however,	   it	   does	   not	   simply	   enact	   a	   given	   legal	   and	   political	  
order	  that	  sanctions	  transgressive	  power	  in	  emergency	  situations.	  The	  exceptionalist	  actualisation	  of	  
the	  decision	  also	  posits	  a	  politics	  of	   creating	  ex	  nihilo.	  Declaring	   that	   the	  existing	  normative	  order	  
cannot	  cope	  with	  an	  existentially	  threatening	  situation	  then	  implies	  a	  claim	  to	  enact	  new	  possibilities	  
of	  what	   is	   right	   and	  wrong.	   This	   conception	   links	   the	   security	   speech	   act	   to	   the	   recent	   revival	   of	  
conceptions	  of	  sovereignty	  as	  the	  expression	  of	  a	  politics	  that	   is	  placed	  both	  inside	  and	  outside	  an	  
existing	  normative	  order.5	  	  
More	  directly	  important	  for	  the	  discussion	  here	  is	  that	  it	  links	  the	  act	  to	  moments	  of	  political	  gravity	  
and	   a	   split	   between	   political	   exceptionality	   and	   normality.	   Exceptionalist	   acts	   are	   not	   ephemeral	  
disruptions	   but	   key	   events	   which	   put	   the	   existing	   order	   in	   the	   balance;	   they	   posit	   politics	   as	  
moments	  with	  decisional	  gravity	  –	  sovereign	  moments.	  Declaring	  an	  existential	  condition	  pulls	  forces	  
towards	   a	   decisive	   scene,	   an	   assembly	   of	   actions	   and	   actors	   that	   carry	   weight	   both	   in	   terms	   of	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4	  The	  politicizing	  nature	  of	  declaring	  existential	  insecurity	  is	  not	  often	  picked	  up	  in	  the	  literature	  on	  
securitizing.	  The	  most	  outspoken	  articulation	  of	  it	  is	  in	  work	  that	  embraces	  the	  Schmittean	  notion	  of	  the	  
political	  that	  is	  invested	  in	  the	  speech	  act	  of	  security.	  On	  the	  latter	  see	  especially:	  Behnke	  (forthcoming	  2011)	  	  
5	  Currently	  this	  idea	  is	  mobilised	  by	  references	  to	  Agamben’s	  work	  who	  borrows	  the	  idea	  from	  Schmitt	  
(Agamben,	  1998).	  Conceptions	  of	  the	  political	  based	  on	  the	  paradox	  of	  the	  act	  should	  not	  be	  simply	  reduced	  to	  
a	  Schmittean	  inspired	  conception	  of	  sovereignty,	  however.	  There	  is	  more	  to	  political	  theory	  of	  the	  act	  (Isin	  and	  
Nielsen,	  2008;	  Villa,	  1996;	  Arendt	  1958)	  and	  sovereignty	  (Prokhovnik,	  2007,	  Walker	  2010)	  than	  Agamben	  and	  
Schmitt.	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producing	   cracks	   in	   a	   given	   order	   and	   making	   issues	   into	   a	   test	   case.	   Exceptionalist	   politics	   also	  
draws	   a	   sharp	   distinction	   between	   the	   routine,	   alienation,	   reiteration	   of	   the	   everyday	   and	   the	  
decisiveness	  and	  creativity	  of	  the	  moments	  of	  exception	  –	  the	  moments	  of	  existential	  threat.	  Speech	  
acts	  of	   security	  enact	  a	   sharp	  distinction	  between	   the	  exceptional	  and	   the	  banal,	   the	  political	  and	  
the	  everyday,	  the	  routine	  and	  creative.	  This	   implies	  an	  elitist	  vision	  of	  politics.	  Securitising	  analysis	  
mostly	   focuses	   on	   leaders	   or	   politicians	   –	   ‘statesmen’	   –	   who	   speak	   security	   with	   sufficient	   cloud	  
while	  ordinary	  people	  continue	  their	  everyday	  life.	  	  
To	   sum	   up,	   the	   conception	   of	   act	   that	   is	   at	   work	   in	   the	   security	   speech	   act	   thus	   combines	   two	  
political	  elements.	  First	  the	  speech	  act	  of	  security	   is	  a	  creative	  move	  that	  ruptures	  a	  given	  state	  of	  
affairs	  –	  security	  is	  made	  were	  it	  was	  not.	  Secondly,	  the	  political	  conception	  of	  rupture	  is	  folded	  into	  
an	  exceptionalist	  scripting	  of	  the	  act	  –	  breaking	  the	  normal	  rules	  of	  the	  game	  on	  existential	  grounds.	  
Second,	  although	  it	  is	  this	  notion	  of	  rupturing	  in	  which	  the	  possibility	  for	  political	  critique	  is	  invested,	  
the	  substantive	  conception	  of	  politics	   that	   is	  mobilised	   in	   the	  critique	  mirrors	  key	  elements	  of	   the	  
exceptionalist	   reading	  of	   the	  nature	  of	  politics,	   and	   in	  particular	   the	   importance	  of	  decisions	  with	  
gravity	  and	  a	  distinction	  between	  the	  extra-­‐ordinary	  and	  ordinary,	  between	  the	  exceptional	  and	  the	  
banal.	  
These	   two	   characteristics	   of	   exceptionalist	   acts	   do	   not	   cover	   all	   there	   is	   to	   the	   exceptionalism	   as	  
mobilised	  in	  the	  security	  speech	  act	  but	  they	  are	  important	  for	  raising	  another	  issue	  that	  is	  at	  stake	  
in	  opening	  up	  the	  question	  of	  the	  meaning	  of	  the	  concept	  of	  ‘act’.	  So	  far,	  I	  have	  focused	  on	  setting	  
out	  the	  importance	  of	  revisiting	  the	  concept	  of	  ‘act’	  in	  the	  speech	  act	  of	  security	  if	  we	  are	  interested	  
in	   the	   conception	   of	   politics	   and	   the	   conditions	   of	   political	   critique	   that	   are	   invested	   in	   the	  
securitisation	   approach.	   It	   is	   a	   call	   for	   engaging	   the	   notion	   of	   ‘act’	   in	   relation	   to	   a	   literature	   on	  
security	   speech	   acts	   that	   has	   focused	   heavily	   on	   speech	   and	   its	   limits.	   In	   the	   second	   part	   of	   the	  
article	   I	   want	   to	   argue	   that	   revisiting	   the	   notion	   of	   ‘act’	   cannot	   uncritically	   reproduce	   its	  
exceptionalist	   framing,	   however.	   I	   have	   argued	   the	   ethico-­‐political	   stakes	   of	   such	   a	   reproduction,	  
elsewhere	   (Huysmans	   1998,	   2006).	   Here,	   I	  want	   to	   bring	   out	   a	  more	   sociological	   reason.	   Reading	  
politics	  through	  a	  conception	  of	  act	  that	  works	  with	  a	  sharp	  distinction	  between	  the	  everyday	  and	  
the	   exceptional	   and	   that	   links	   political	   rupture	   to	   a	   gravitational	   conception	   of	   decision	   is	  
problematic	   for	   securitising	  processes	   in	  which	   little	   security	  nothings	   rather	   than	  political	   speech	  
acts	  with	  critical	  weight	  do	  the	  securitising	  work.	  In	  remainder	  of	  the	  article,	  I	  argue	  that	  securitising	  
processes	  that	  efface	  security	  speech	  acts	  as	  substantiated	  by	  Wæver	  and	  Buzan,	  add	  an	  important	  
complication	   to	   a	   project	   that	   seeks	   to	   recapture	   the	   politicality	   of	   security	   practice	   through	   the	  
concept	  of	  ‘act’.	  
Act-­‐effacing	  securitising?	  
Securitising	  in	  contemporary	  world	  politics	  develops	  significantly	  through	  unspectacular	  processes	  of	  
technologically	   driven	   surveillance,	   risk	   management,	   and	   precautionary	   governance.	   These	  
processes	  are	   less	  about	  declaring	  a	   territorialised	  enemy	  and	  threat	  of	  war	  than	  about	  dispersing	  
techniques	  of	   administering	  uncertainty	   and	   ‘mapping’	   dangers.	   I	   am	  not	   talking	   in	   the	   first	   place	  
about	   ‘the	   war	   on	   terror’,	   which	   has	   now	   become	   a	   central	   reference	   point	   for	   many	   of	   these	  
discussions,	  but	  about	   the	  dispersal	  of	   risk	  management	   techniques,	   surveillance,	  data	  mining	  and	  
profiling,	   the	   rendition	  of	  objects	   like	   letters	   into	  matters	  of	   concern	  over	  danger	   (Neyland,	  2009)	  
and	  other	  processes	  of	  rendering	  and	  dispersing	  insecurities.	  A	  rich	  body	  of	  work	  exists	  that	  analyses	  
the	   nature	   and	   implications	   of	   surveillance,	   precautionary	   and	   pre-­‐emptive	   security	   practice,	   and	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governing	  through	  risk	  (Amoore	  and	  de	  Goede,	  2008c,	  Aradau	  et	  al.,	  2008,	  Aradau	  and	  van	  Munster,	  
2008,	   Daase	   and	   Kessler,	   2007,	   Ericson,	   2007,	   Ericson	   and	   Haggerty,	   1997,	   Lobo-­‐Guerrero	   2011,	  
Tsoukala,	  2009).	  One	  of	  the	  peculiar	  elements	  that	   is	  brought	  out	  by	  some	  of	  this	   literature	  is	  that	  
this	  securitising	  process	  effaces	  ‘acts’.	  
In	   the	   dispersed	   practices	   of	   the	   contemporary	   security	   apparatus,	   we	   may	   never	   know	   if	   a	  
decision	  is	  a	  decision	  (…)	  or	  if	  it	  has	  been	  ‘controlled	  by	  previous	  knowledge’	  and	  ‘programmed’.	  
(Amoore	  &	  de	  Goede	  2008b:	  180)	  
The	  statement	  can	  be	  read	  in	  different	  ways	  but	  I	  want	  to	  bring	  out	  two	  particular	  characteristics	  of	  
this	  securitising	  process	  that	  indicate	  that	  ‘acts’	  –	  i.e.	  actualisations	  of	  decisions	  –	  as	  defined	  in	  the	  
speech	  act	  approach	  are	  a	  problematic	  category	   for	   the	  analysis	  as	  well	  as	  political	  critique	  of	   this	  
process.	  The	  speech	  act	  of	  security	  works	  with	  a	  notion	  of	  gravitation	  rather	  than	  diffusion	  and	  with	  
a	   distinction	   between	   the	   everyday	   and	   the	   exceptionality	   of	   security	   acts.	   A	   process	   that	   erodes	  
decisions	  challenges	  both.	  
The	  securitising	  that	  Amoore	  and	  de	  Goede	  refer	  to	  is	  a	  highly	  dispersed	  and	  dispersing	  practice.	  It	  is	  
heavily	  mediated	  by	  surveillance	  technologies	  that	  associate	  people,	  sites,	  things,	  and	  time	  into	  risk	  
profiles.	   As	   a	   result	   the	   process	   is	   strongly	   ‘automated’,	   not	   in	   the	   sense	   of	   a	  machine	   just	   doing	  
what	   it	   is	   programmed	   to	   do,	   but	   in	   the	   sense	   of	   a	   process	   that	   associates	   largely	  without	   single	  
critical	  moments	   of	   decision6.	   Decisions	   are	   taken	   all	   the	   time,	   both	   in	   the	   development	   and	   the	  
application	  but	  they	  are	  dispersed	  and	  it	  is	  relatively	  difficult	  to	  assign	  critically	  significant	  actions	  to	  
particular	  actors	  or	  to	  aggregate	  sets	  of	  actions	  into	  a	  limited	  group	  of	  actors	  who	  have	  the	  capacity	  
to	  create	  an	  assemblage	  of	  security.	  Securitising	  develops	  through	  a	  wide	  variety	  of	  mediators	  that	  
connect	   data,	   people,	   sites,	   and	   times	   but	   in	   connecting	   also	   change	   the	   material	   they	   are	  
connecting	   (Latour,	   2005:	   39)	   –	   e.g.	   programming	   an	   algorithm	   that	   connects	   data	   in	   a	   way	   that	  
differentiates	   patterns	   of	   travelling	   in	   degrees	   of	   danger.	   If	  mediations	   are	   numerous,	   constantly	  
shifting	   and	   dispersed,	   it	   becomes	   very	   difficult	   if	   not	   impossible	   to	   assess	   which	   actions	   are	  
actualising	  a	  decision	   that	  brings	   into	  play	   the	   limits	  of	  a	  given	  order	  and	   that	  has	  gravity.	  Gravity	  
refers	   to	   a	   capacity	   for	   producing	   cracks	   and	   can	   be	   grounded	   in	   institutionalised	   position,	  
mobilisation	  of	  bodies,	  unexpected	  public	  action,	  etc.	  	  
As	  argued	  in	  the	  previous	  section,	  the	  concept	  of	  ‘act’	  politicises	  securitising	  processes	  precisely	  by	  
identifying	  particular	  moments	  that	  concentrate	  developments	  into	  actualisations	  of	  a	  decision	  that	  
ruptures	  normal	  procedures	  of	  practice.	  If	  instead	  of	  ‘moments	  of	  critical	  decision’	  we	  have	  a	  myriad	  
of	  decisions	  in	  a	  process	  that	  is	  continuously	  made	  and	  remade,	  then	  what	  is	  left	  of	  the	  analytics	  as	  
well	  as	  political	  critique	  of	  securitising	  that	  is	  invested	  in	  the	  notion	  of	  speech	  act?	  It	  invites	  moving	  
from	   speech	  acts	   of	   security	   to	   concepts	   and	  methodologies	   that	   facilitate	   studying	  practices	   and	  
processes	  of	  dispersed	  associating.	  From	  the	  perspective	  of	  ‘speech	  acts’	  this	  associating	  will	  mostly	  
look	   unspectacular,	   unexceptional,	   continuous,	   and	   repetitive;	   instead	   of	   speech	   acts	   we	   get	   the	  
securitising	  ‘work’	  of	  a	  multiplicity	  of	  little	  security	  nothings.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6	  For	  example:	  G.J.D.	  Smith	  shows	  the	  complexity	  of	  assembling	  surveillance	  via	  CCTV	  when	  looked	  at	  from	  the	  
perspective	  of	  the	  practice	  of	  CCTV	  operators:	  (Smith,	  2009)	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To	  briefly	  illustrate	  the	  shift	  in	  perspective	  that	  is	  implied	  here,	  let’s	  re-­‐read	  Daniel	  Neyland’s	  (2009),	  
example	   of	   how	   letters,	   as	   everyday	   	   objects,	   are	   transformed	   into	   an	   object	   of	   danger.7	   In	   his	  
analysis	  of	  mundane	  terror	  Neyland	  mentions	  a	  webpage	  on	   letter	  bombs	  that	  the	  British	  Security	  
Service	   MI5	   had	   temporarily	   set	   up.	   The	   website	   was	   one	   device	   in	   which	   MI5	   was	   securitising	  
letters.	  	  In	  setting	  out	  what	  a	  letter	  bomb	  is,	  how	  to	  recognise	  a	  suspicious	  letter,	  how	  to	  deal	  with	  
it,	   MI5	   appropriated	   a	   mundane	   object	   in	   a	   securitising	   process.	   The	   letter	   bomb	   is	   not	   simply	  
appropriated	  by	  a	  security	  agency,	  however,	  It	  also	  stands	  for	  a	  whole	  set	  of	  banal,	  little	  connections	  
(e.g.	   postal	   delivery,	   postal	   sorting,	   explosive	   or	   incendiary	   substances,	   posting,	   unusual	   place	   of	  
origin,	  couriers,	  recipients,	  the	  place	  of	  origin	  of	  the	  sender,	  police).	  Interpreting	  the	  website	  as	  an	  
action	   by	   MI5	   to	   securitise	   letters	   by	   setting	   out	   a	   set	   of	   criteria	   and	   guidelines	   would	   focus	  
attention	  on	  the	  gravitational	  force	  of	  this	  moment	  and	  somehow	  disconnect	  it	  from	  the	  ‘network	  of	  
connections’	  in	  which	  the	  website	  operates	  as	  a	  mediator.	  Taking	  the	  website	  as	  a	  mediating	  device	  
connecting	  things	  and	  people	  among	  whom	  suspicion	  of	  letters	  might	  or	  might	  not	  already	  circulate	  
would	  draw	  attention	  immediately	  to	  the	  diffuse	  associating	  that	  is	  taking	  place.	  The	  website	  can	  be	  
the	   starting	   point	   of	   the	   analysis	   but	   it	   remains	   one	   particular	   thing	   and	   moment	   in	   a	   set	   of	  
connections	   and	   mediations	   that	   took	   place	   simultaneously,	   before	   and	   after.	   In	   the	   end,	   the	  
analytics	   places	   the	  website	   not	   as	   a	   securitising	  moment	  with	   critical	   gravity	   –	   i.e.	   a	  moment	   in	  
which	  one	  had	  a	  non-­‐security	  situation	  before	  and	  a	  security	  situation	  after	  –	  but	  as	  one	  of	  several	  
relatively	   small	   moments	   and	   actions	   that	   invest	   insecurity	   in	   everyday	   objects	   and	   relations.	  
Securitising	   then	   takes	   the	   form	  of	   a	   scatterred	  process	   in	  which	   the	  website	   and	   letters	   connect	  
various	  things	  and	  persons	  in	  a	  network	  of	  suspicion.	  Such	  an	  analysis	  shifts	  understanding	  from	  the	  
website	   as	   a	   speech	   act	   to	   the	   diffuse	   securitising	   work	   in	   which	   what	   appears	   as	   little	   security	  
nothings	  from	  the	  perspective	  of	  security	  speech	  acts	  play	  the	  key	  role.	  	  
This	   associative	   interpretation	   of	   letter	   bombs	   also	   brings	   out	   that	   the	   diffuse	   processes	   of	  
securitising	   challenge	   the	   boundary	   between	   security	   practice	   and	   daily	   life.	   The	   letters	   move	  
through	  a	  wide	  set	  of	  banal	  relations.	  Many	  surveillance	  practices	  can	  be	  read	  in	  a	  similar	  way.	  The	  
often	  are	  strongly	  embedded	   in	  everyday	  actions	  and	  relations,	   thus	  coming	  across	  as	  routine	  and	  
banal;	   a	   banality	   which	   is	   reinforced	   by	   the	   strong	   technological	  mediation	   of	   data	   and	   practice.	  
Writing	   algorithms	   is	   central	   to	   the	   functioning	   of	   data	  mining.	   Introducing	   loyalty	   cards	   to	   track	  
consumption	   patterns,	   introducing	   credit	   card	   payments	   as	   the	   obvious	   form	   of	   payment	   thus	  
making	  it	  possible	  to	  profile	  cash	  payments	  as	  suspicious,	  and	  developing	  many	  other	  data	  gathering	  
devices	  are	  central	  to	  turn	  transactional	  traces	  into	  insecurity	  profiles.	  Many	  of	  these	  practices	  come	  
about	   in	   piecemeal	   fashion	   and	   slip	   into	   daily	   life	  without	  much	   ado	   and	  when	   connected	   to	   the	  
rendition	  and	  dispersal	  of	  risks,	  precaution	  and	  control	  of	  dangers	  fade	  out	  the	  distinction	  between	  
the	  everyday	  and	  security	  practice.	  Governing	  sites	  and	   lives	  through	  risk	  calculation,	   for	  example,	  
often	  operate	  in	  diverse	  areas	  of	  life	  meshing	  policing	  with	  insurance	  practice,	  business	  with	  national	  
security,	   etc.	   (Amoore,	   2006,	   Ericson	   and	   Haggerty,	   1997	   ,	   Lobo-­‐Guerrero	   2011,	   Lund	   Petersen,	  
2008)	  
In	   these	   securitising	   processes	   daily	   life	   as	   a	   realm	   upon	   which	   security	   professionals	   practice	  
protection	   is	   folded	   into	   the	   security	   practice	   itself.	   Risk	   management,	   surveillance,	   and	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7	  Several	  mundane	  objects	  are	  made	  into	  carriers	  of	  danger	  nowadays	  (e.g.	  bottles	  of	  liquids,	  fertilizers	  
(http://www.secureyourfertiliser.gov.uk/),	  etc.).	  Each	  would	  lend	  itself	  nicely	  to	  an	  analytics	  of	  dispersed	  
mediation	  and	  tracing	  of	  networks	  of	  insecurity.	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precautionary	  methods	  work	  within	  daily	  life,	  as	  much	  as	  upon	  it.	  Credit	  cards,	  cctv,	  filling	  in	  forms	  
for	  a	  myriad	  of	  services,	  monitoring	  workers,	  consumer	  data,	  advertising	  that	  sustains	  precautionary	  
dispositions,	   products	   carrying	   risks	   (e.g.	   fertilisers)	   intertwine	   profiling,	   control,	   national	   security	  
with	  daily	   activities.	   The	   issue	   is	   therefore	  not	   simply	   a	   securitisation	  of	   everyday	   life,	   i.e.	  making	  
daily	   life	  an	  object	  of	   security	  practice	  or	  everyday	  objects	  and	  practices	  becoming	  carriers	  of	   risk	  
and	  danger	  (Aas	  et	  al.,	  2009:	  2)	  The	  rendition	  and	  circulation	  of	  insecurity	  takes	  place	  through	  daily	  
practices	   themselves	  making	   it	  difficult	   to	  separate	   the	  governmental	  apparatus,	  private	  or	  public,	  
that	  work	  upon	  daily	  life	  by	  means	  of	  the	  practices	  of	  daily	  life	  themselves	  (Furedi,	  2002,	  Huysmans,	  
2009,	  Isin,	  2004).	  Many	  little	  and	  banal	  daily	  activities,	  meetings,	  regulations	  are	  actively	  part	  of	  the	  
shaping	  of	  securitising	  processes.	  	  
Securitising	  I	  am	  referring	  to	  here	  is	  less	  an	  actualisation	  of	  a	  critical	  decision	  and	  more	  a	  continuous	  
process	   of	   assembling	   objects,	   subjects	   and	   practices.	   The	   loss	   of	   decisional	   gravitation	   and	   of	   a	  
separation	  between	  the	  everyday	  and	  the	  exceptional	  challenge	  the	  notion	  of	  exceptionalist	  rupture	  
that	  is	  embedded	  in	  the	  speech	  act	  of	  security.	  The	  concept	  of	  ‘rupture’	  draws	  attention	  to	  a	  fixed	  
frame	  of	  reference,	  a	  given	  order	  that	  has	  been	  able	  to	  aggregate	  a	  multiplicity	  of	  practices,	  subjects	  
and	  objects	  into	  a	  whole	  expressing	  a	  particular	  rationale.	  The	  rupture	  is	  an	  event	  that	  demonstrates	  
the	  existence	  of	  order	  and	  its	  limits	  by	  breaking	  the	  ‘habitual’.	  In	  exceptionalist	  readings	  of	  rupture	  
power	   consists	   in	   the	   capacity	   and	   practice	   of	   aggregating	   and	   fixing	   multiplicity	   into	   a	   ‘global’	  
practice	  and	  in	  the	  capacity	  to	  disrupt	  the	  aggregation	  so	  as	  to	  make	  new	  aggregations	  possible.	  Yet,	  
decisional	  speech	  acts	  and	  ruptures	   lose	  much	  of	  their	  critical	  significance	   in	  a	  securitising	  process	  
that	  create	  insecurities	  mainly	  through	  dispersing,	  through	  continuously	  associating,	  re-­‐associating,	  
tweaking	  and	  experimenting	  with	  materials,	  procedures,	  regulations,	  etc.	  The	  scene	  of	  securitising	  is	  
then	  not	  one	  of	  expressing	  or	  disrupting	  a	  given	  order	  but	  of	  creating	  things,	  meanings,	  subjects	  in	  
habitual,	  everyday	  innovation	  in	  meetings,	  discussions,	  regulations,	  programming,	  etc.	  Power	  is	  then	  
to	   be	   understood	   as	   infinitesimal	   mediations,	   as	   little	   nothings,	   dispersed	   in	   a	   continuously	  
developing	  security	  bricolage	  that	  takes	  place	  in	  practices	  of	  sketching,	  trials,	  meetings,	  regulations,	  
etc.	  (Latour,	  2005)	  Exceptional	  rupture	  gives	  way	  to	  innovations	  and	  controversies	  that	  are	  worked	  
in	  dispersed	  sites	  and	  habitual	  everyday,	  ordinary	  practices	  of	  associating	  (see	  e.g.	  Walters	  (2011)	  on	  
standardisation	  practices).8	  In	  relation	  to	  such	  processes,	  decisional	  speech	  acts	  with	  gravitas	  have	  at	  
best	   limited	   analytical	   relevance	   and	   at	   worst	   misconstrue	   the	   analysis	   by	   assigning	   excessive	  
significance	  to	  actions	  that	  have	   limited	  power	  –	  that	  are	  themselves	  simply	  another	   little	  security	  
nothing	   that	   gains	   its	   significance	   from	   the	   limited	   work	   it	   does	   in	   a	   highly	   diffuse	   associative	  
process.	  
The	  politicality	  of	  effacing	  acts	  	  
Questioning	   the	   adequacy	   of	   the	   concept	   of	   ‘security	   speech	   act’	   has	   implications	   for	   the	  
understanding	   of	   the	   politics	   of	   insecurity	   and	   the	   possibility	   of	   a	   political	   critique	   of	   securitising.	  
Both	  security	  professionals	  and	  the	  political	  elite	  often	  efface	  decisive	  acts	  that	  open	  the	  full	  register	  
of	  answerability	   from	  the	  securitising	  process.	  They	  emphasise	  the	  necessity	  and	  the	  technological	  
nature	  of	  the	  process.	  Decisions	  are	  presented	  as	  calculations	  of	  efficiency	  and	  effectiveness.	  Social	  
control	   and	   surveillance	   is	   introduced	   for	   a	   particular	   event	   (e.g.	   Olympic	   games)	   or	   in	   particular	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8	  The	  difficulty	  to	  separate	  public	  from	  private	  in	  these	  processes	  further	  reinforces	  the	  difficulty	  to	  identify	  
the	  exceptional	  moments	  that	  mostly	  work	  through	  public	  manifestation.	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sites	   (e.g.	   shopping	   mall)	   and	   then	   expands	   to	   other	   areas	   of	   life	   without	   much	   public	  
discussion.(Amoore	   and	   de	   Goede,	   2008b,	   Tsoukala,	   2009)	   The	   turn	   in	   security	   strategy	   to	   risk	  
management	   and	   technologically	   mediated	   pre-­‐emption	   and	   surveillance	   is	   often	   interpreted	   as	  
reinforcing	  the	  technocratic	  and	  dispersing	  orientation	  of	  securitising.	  These	  developments	  are	  seen	  
as	   being	   particularly	   successful	   in	   effacing	   security	   speech	   acts	   from	   the	   process,	   circumventing	  
public	  processes	  of	  legitimisation	  and	  decision-­‐making.	  	  
In	  these	  situations,	  retaining	  the	  political	  spectre	  invested	  in	  the	  notion	  of	  ‘speech	  act	  is	  at	  first	  sight	  
important	   for	   retaining	   the	  possibility	   of	   political	   critique,	   for	   not	   naively	   falling	   into	   reproductive	  
knowledge	   that	   iteratively	   sustains	   presentations	   of	   a	   technocratic	   and	   heavily	   depoliticized	  
process.9	  The	  concept	  of	  ‘security	  act’	  makes	  a	  critical	  analysis	  possible	  by	  drawing	  attention	  to	  the	  
decisions	   that	   are	   taken	   in	   this	   process	   and	   the	  moments	   of	   gravity	  when	   significant	   choices	   are	  
made	   to	   securitise.	   It	   connects	   technocratic	   discourse	   and	  practice	   back	   to	   political	   decisions	   and	  
answerability,	  and	  thus	  to	  questions	  of	  accountability,	  legitimacy,	  and	  public	  judgement.	  	  
The	  issue,	  however,	  is	  how	  to	  engage	  the	  question	  of	  acts	  when	  the	  effacing	  of	  ‘acts	  of	  security’	  in	  
the	  dispersal	  of	  decisions	  and	  the	  folding	  of	  daily	  life	  and	  security	  practice	  is	  part	  of	  the	  very	  nature	  
of	  this	  securitising	  process.	  The	  effacing	  is	  not	  a	  symbolic	  strategy	  simply	  hiding	  the	  significance	  of	  
‘speech	   acts	   of	   security’.	   It	   is	   ontological	   rather	   than	   ideological.	   ‘Ontologising’	   processes	   always	  
runs	   the	   risk	   of	   ‘naturalising’	   what	   for	   political	   analysis	   –	   in	   this	   case,	   of	   surveillance	   and	   risk	  
management	  –	  is	  a	  key	  political	  stake:	  the	  de-­‐politicising	  of	  security	  (Amoore	  and	  de	  Goede,	  2008c,	  
Ericson,	  2007,	  Lyon,	  2001,	  Lyon,	  2007,	  Lyon,	  2006).	  Does	  a	  security	  analytics	  of	  assembling	  of	   little	  
security	  nothings	  that	  I	  propose	  above	  not	  end	  up	  simply	  reproducing	  the	  de-­‐politicising	  process	  of	  
diffuse	   securitising?	   Effacing	   ‘acts’	   seems	   to	   come	   down	   to	   effacing	   the	   conditions	   of	   political	  
critique	  of	  securitising,	  a	  condition	  which	  the	  concept	  of	  ‘speech	  act’	  of	  security	  did	  so	  outspokenly	  
reintroduce	   in	   security	   studies.	   Therefore,	   one	   can	   argue	   that	   the	   importance	   of	   the	   diffuse	  
processes	  of	  securitising	  today	  make	  it	  more	  rather	  than	  less	  urgent	  to	  revisit	  the	  notion	  of	  act	  and	  
the	  conditions	  of	  its	  possibility.	  	  
If	   the	   processes	   demonstrate	   a	   radical	   dispersed	   associating	   in	   which	   decisive	   speech	   acts	   –	   as	  
understood	   in	   the	   securitisation	   approach	   –	   are	   indeed	   not	   particularly	   significant,	   or	   more	  
adequately,	   if	   the	   action	   one	   would	   normally	   identify	   as	   such	   an	   act	   (e.g.	   a	   declaration	   by	   the	  
president)	   are	   of	   marginal	   or	   only	   limited	   significance	   to	   how	   the	   process	   intertwines	   practices,	  
people	  and	  things	  over	  time	  and	  in	  sites	  in	  novel	  ways,	  a	  project	  of	  re-­‐engaging	  acts	  as	  the	  condition	  
of	  a	  political	  analytics	  and	  critique	  cannot	  simply	  reproduce	  the	  conception	  of	  speech	  act	  as	  set	  out	  
above,	   however.	   For	   example,	   many	   of	   the	   securitising	   practices	   continuously	   work	   across	   the	  
public/private	  boundary	  therefore	  challenging	  the	  relevance	  of	  this	  distinction	  for	  understanding	  the	  
practices	  of	  associating	  and	  for	  bringing	  a	  political	  critique	  to	  bear	  upon	  them;	  calling	  simply	   for	  a	  
decisive	   public	   debate	   and	   contestation	   cannot	   be	   an	   unquestioned	   default	   position	   of	   political	  
answers	  to	  the	  depoliticising	  work	  of	  securitising	  practice.	  Unquestioningly	  harking	  back	  to	  ‘acts’	  as	  
the	  key	   to	   the	  politics	  of	   insecurity	  would	  be	  equally	  naive	   to	  simply	  embracing	   the	   idea	   that	  acts	  
have	   vanished.	   If	   the	   securitising	   developed	   in	   surveillance,	   risk	   management	   and	   precautionary	  
practice	   indeed	   works	   in	   such	   a	   way	   that	   decisions	   with	   gravity	   are	   ontologically	   marginalised	   –	  
rather	  than	  strategically,	  calculatively	  hidden	  –	  than	  the	  conception	  of	  act	  as	  developed	  by	  Wæver	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9	  For	  a	  classic	  statement	  along	  these	  lines,	  see	  Hannah	  Arendt’s	  Eichmann	  in	  Jerusalem.	  (Arendt,	  1963)	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and	   Buzan	  will	   neither	   provide	   the	   claimed	   analytical	   insight	   into	   the	  workings	   of	   power	   nor	   the	  
possibility	   for	   effective	   political	   critique.	  One	  of	   the	   key	   challenges	  of	   arguing	   for	   re-­‐engaging	   the	  
notion	  of	  act	  –	  as	  I	  did	  in	  the	  first	  section	  –	  therefore	  is	  to	  reconceptualise	  the	  notion	  of	  act	  and	  the	  
politicality	   invested	   in	   its	   understanding	   of	   rupture	   so	   that	   it	   can	   support	   a	   political	   analytics	   and	  
critique	   of	   associating,	   assembling,	   dispersing	   security	   practices	   in	   which	   the	   distinction	   between	  
ordinary	  and	  extra-­‐ordinary,	  everyday	  and	  exceptional	  are	  folded	  and	  in	  which	  exceptional	  ruptures	  
become	  processes	  of	  often	  little	  innovations,	  struggles	  become	  mundane	  controversies,	  and	  orders	  
become	  temporary	  limited	  settlements.	  
The	   challenges	   involved	   in	   reformulating	   acts	   as	   rupture	   and	   answerability	   in	   relation	   to	   diffuse	  
associative	  securitising	  without	  somehow	  falling	  back	  into	  linking	  little	  actions	  to	  the	  immense	  state	  
sovereignty	  invested	  in	  them	  has	  become	  very	  visible	  in	  some	  analyses	  of	  US	  and	  European	  counter-­‐
terrorist	  practice.	  Let	  me	  use	  the	  work	  on	  surveillance,	  bordering	  and	  tracing	  by	  Louise	  Amoore	  and	  
Marieke	  de	  Goede	  (2008b)	  as	  an	  example.	  As	  indicated	  in	  the	  previous	  section,	  their	  work	  analyses	  
how	   the	   securitising	   of	   transactions	   in	   the	  war	   on	   terror	   is	   driven	   by	  mundane	   technologies	   and	  
mostly	   relatively	   unspectacular	   actions.	   They	   show	   how	   in	   this	   process	   decisive	   acts,	   distinctions	  
between	  public	   and	  private,	   etc.	   are	   eroded	  and	  how	   security	  practices	   folds	   into	  daily	   life.	  What	  
interests	  me	  here	  though	  is	  that	  they	  also	  explicitly	  tackle	  the	  question	  of	  what	  politics	  of	  insecurity	  
is	   taking	   place	   and	   what	   a	   political	   critique	   of	   these	   diffuse	   processes	   can	   be.	   Although	   the	  
securitising	   process	   is	   dispersing,	   folding	   into	   daily	   life	   and	   effacing	   exceptional	   decisions,	   the	  
political	   dimension	  of	   their	  work	   start	   from	  a	   critique	  of	   the	   exceptionality	   that	   security	   practices	  
create.	  ‘[T]ransactions	  become	  precisely	  the	  basis	  for	  designation	  of	  exception,	  for	  the	  settling	  out	  of	  
finite	   differentials	   of	   normality	   and	   deviation.’	   (Amoore	   and	   de	   Goede,	   2008b:	   174)	   The	   data	  
gathering	  and	  practices	  of	  control	  become	  politically	  important	  because	  they	  aggregate	  transactions	  
into	   ‘a	  broader	  assemblage	  of	   “screening”	  practices	   that	  algorithmically	  designate	  and	  classify	   the	  
population’	  (Amoore	  and	  de	  Goede,	  2008b:	  179)	  and	  in	  doing	  so	  profile	  populations	  who	  are	  placed	  
outside	   of	   the	   order	   and	   can	   be	   treated	   beyond	   the	   normal	   rules	   of	   engagement.	   To	   get	   critical	  
leverage	   on	   the	   process	   they	   perform	   the	   Agambean	   move	   of	   accepting	   the	   dispersed	   often	  
technocratic	   forms	   of	   governance	   –	   usually	   conceptualised	   in	   line	   with	   Foucault’s	   analytics	   of	  
biopolitics	  and	  governmentality	  –	  while	  continuing	  to	  focus	  politics	  on	  sites	  of	  exceptionalism	  where	  
securitising	   works	   through	   displacing	   the	   practices	   of	   democratic	   governance	   most	   extremely	  
(Mühle	  2007).	  Political	  critique	  becomes	  possible	  at	  this	  point	  by	  breaking	  a	  depersonalised	  logic	  of	  
assembling	   down	   into	   embodied	   acts	   that	   actualise	   decisions	   contributing	   to	   the	   rupturing	   of	   the	  
given	  framework	  of	  citizenship,	  human	  rights,	  etc.	  with	  exceptionalist	  consequences.	  The	  rupture	  in	  
democratic	   practice	   is	   made	   personal	   by	   assigning	   ‘critical’	   decision-­‐making	   to	   particular	   people.	  
Amoore	   and	   de	   Goede	   (2008a:	   13)	   draw	   among	   others	   on	   Judith	   Butler,	   here.	   Butler	   works	   this	  
scheme	   by	   devolving	   the	   sovereign	   power	   to	   decide	   arbitrarily	   to	   the	   many	   professionals	   who	  
implement	   policies,	   including	   immigration	   officials,	   border	   guards,	   private	   security	   personnel,	   and	  
thus	  make	  sovereign	  arbitrary	  decisions,	  partly	  deriving	  from	  embodying	  the	  power	  of	  the	  state,	  in	  
everyday	   engagements	   –	   she	   refers	   to	   them	   as	   ‘petty	   sovereigns’10.	   (Butler,	   2004:	   56)	   It	   is	   the	  
judgement	  and	  action	  of	   the	  official	  and	  quasi-­‐official	   individuals	  who	   ‘implement’	  security	   for	   the	  
state	   that	   makes	   them	   accountable	   and	   responsible.	   In	   doing	   so,	   sovereignty	   as	   the	   way	   into	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10	  Labelling	  them	  as	  petty	  sovereigns	  overstates	  the	  power	  they	  often	  have	  but	  also	  simplifies	  the	  complexity	  
of	  practices	  that	  take	  place	  and	  the	  significance	  of	  their	  place	  in	  a	  much	  broader	  practice	  of	  assembling.	  See	  
for	  example:	  Smith,	  2009.	  
12	  
understanding	   politics	   is	   saved	   in	   a	   security	   process	   in	   which	   the	   normal	   process	   of	   aggregation	  
through	  which	  sovereignty	  is	  supposed	  to	  be	  articulated	  is	  difficult	  to	  pin	  down.(Amoore,	  2006)	  We	  
thus	  see	  a	  reintroduction	  of	  acts	  as	  decisions	  with	  gravitational	  power	  –	  the	  many	  petty	  sovereigns	  
enact	  the	  exceptionalism	  of	  the	  state	  –	  that	  can	  be	  publicly	  called	  to	  account	  at	  both	  the	  individual	  
and	  collective	  level.	  
Reintroducing	  exceptional	  acts	  and	  the	  mechanisms	  of	  accountability,	  responsibility,	  and	  legitimacy	  
through	   which	   one	   can	   bring	   these	   sites	   to	   political	   account	   in	   this	   way	   remains	   problematic,	  
however.	  Amoore	  and	  de	  Goede’s	  study	  of	  the	  practices	  of	  surveillance	  and	  risk	  management	  shows	  
that	  the	  process	  functions	  in	  such	  a	  way	  that	  decisions	  with	  gravity,	  which	  can	  be	  identified	  as	  being	  
especially	  significant	   for	  creating	   the	  exceptional	   stratifications	  and	  discriminations,	  are	  difficult	   to	  
find,	  if	  they	  exist	  in	  the	  first	  place.	  Hence	  their	  question:	  ‘How	  is	  responsibility	  to	  be	  reintroduced	  to	  
the	  decision,	   such	   that	   it	   confronts	   the	  political	  difficulties	  of	   indecision?’	   (Amoore	  and	  de	  Goede,	  
2008b:	  182)The	  focus	  on	  responsibility	  in	  this	  question	  does	  not	  hide	  the	  conundrum	  that	  surrounds	  
the	  issue	  of	  decision	  here.	  Is	  retaining	  the	  decision	  –	  an	  act	  that	  actualises	  a	  decision	  that	  has	  special	  
weight	  and	  thus	  can	  be	  called	  responsible	  –	  as	  the	  central	  vehicle	  of	  a	  political	  reading	  and	  critique	  
possible	   and	   valuable	   when	   the	   process	   of	   securitising	   does	   not	   work	   through	   these	   kinds	   of	  
decisions?	   Their	   interpretation	   of	   surveillance	   indicates	   that	   the	   issue	   is	   not	   immediately	   the	  
presence	   or	   absence	   of	   decision	   but	   how	   to	   read	   politically	   dispersal	   and	   processes	   in	   which	  
decisions	   cannot	   be	   aggregated	   into	   critical	   moments	   and	   sites	   that	   rupture	   a	   given	   order.	  
Reinserting	   ‘decision’	   in	   a	   process	   that	   effaces	   it	   does	   not	   solve	   the	   problem.	   It	   leads	   to	   reading	  
politics	   as	   ethics	  with	   its	   focus	   on	   individual	   responsibility	   to	   act	   on	   principles	   of	   conduct	   and	   on	  
aggregating	   –	   rather	   than	   associating	   –	   little	   actions	   by	   connecting	   subjective	   decisions	   to	   the	  
reproduction	   of	   a	   sovereign	   decision	   to	   securitise,	   to	   make	   an	   exception.11	   In	   that	   sense,	   the	  
conception	  of	  politics	  and	  political	  critique	  remains	  locked	  within	  the	  model	  of	  exceptionalism	  –	  and	  
sovereignty	  –	  that	  is	  mobilised	  by	  the	  speech	  act	  of	  security.	  
Conclusion	  
By	  asking	  ‘what	  is	  in	  an	  act?’	  I	  have	  sought	  to	  open	  an	  agenda	  for	  re-­‐engaging	  the	  conception	  of	  act	  
in	   relation	   to	   securitisation.	   I	   argued	   the	   current	   pertinence	   of	   such	   a	   move	   on	   two	   grounds.	  
Working	   in	   greater	   depth	   on	   the	   concept	   of	   act	   recovers	   a	   focus	   on	   conceptions	   of	   politics	   and	  
possibilities	  of	  political	   critique	   in	   the	   literature	  on	   securitising	  which	   increasingly	   concentrates	  on	  
discourse	  analysis,	  sociology	  of	  communication	  and	  the	  limits	  of	  speech.	  Re-­‐engaging	  the	  concept	  of	  
act	   has	   been	  made	   significantly	   more	   complex,	   however,	   given	   the	   contemporary	   significance	   of	  
securitising	  processes	  that	  seem	  to	  efface	  speech	  acts	  of	  security	  that	  have	  decisional	  gravity	  –	  that	  
take	   a	   situation	   from	   non-­‐security	   into	   security.	   Engaging	   the	   question	   of	   the	   politicality	   of	  
securitising	  processes	  through	  the	  notion	  of	  act	  can	  therefore	  not	  simply	  reproduce	  the	  ‘speech	  act	  
of	   security’	   but	   needs	   to	   rethink	   what	   ‘acts’	   can	   be	   in	   diffuse	   securitising	   processes	   where	   little	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11	  Among	  others,	  a	  discussion	  with	  Derridean	  readings	  of	  politics,	  ethics	  and	  decisions,	  which	  informs	  Amoore	  
and	  de	  Goede’s	  reading,	  is	  called	  for	  here.	  Derridean	  approaches	  are	  one	  way	  of	  re-­‐engaging	  the	  question	  of	  
act	  as	  rupture.	  They	  occupy	  an	  interesting	  position	  that	  retains	  elements	  of	  the	  ‘exceptionality’	  of	  acts	  while	  
diluting	  the	  gravitational	  dimensions	  of	  the	  speech	  act.	  I	  can’t	  develop	  that	  discussion	  explicitly	  here,	  however.	  
It	  requires	  a	  more	  lengthy	  engagement,	  especially	  since	  I	  think	  a	  more	  relational	  analytics	  of	  acts	  as	  enactment	  
of	  controversies	  and	  disputes	  is	  a	  more	  interesting	  way	  forward.	  	  
13	  
security	   nothings	   rather	   than	   decisive	   acts	   with	   exceptionalising	   power	   do	   the	   immense	   work	   of	  
making	  and	  circulating	  insecurities.12	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